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REVEILLE FOR CONGRESS: A CHALLENGE TO REVISE
RAPE LAW IN THE MILITARY
INTRODUCTION
When the chips are down and our subordinates have accepted us
as their leader, we don't need any superior to tell us; we see it in
their eyes and in their faces, in the barracks, on the field, and on
the battle line. And on that final day when we must be
ruthlessly demanding, cruel and heartless, they will rise as one
to do our bidding, knowing full well that it may be their last act
in this life.'
The unique relationship between a military leader and his or her
subordinate is at once both powerful and fragile; strong enough to
compel the subordinate to put life and liberty on the line, yet fragile
enough that it cannot thrive in anything short of an environment of
complete trust. All too often, however, this trust between military
leaders, peers, and subordinates is undermined by coercive sexual
imposition.
The United States military's rape law does not effectively
prevent sexual coercion. Those victimized by fellow service mem-
bers suffer a loss of autonomy and privacy as a result of sexual
pressures taking a number of forms not yet adequately addressed
by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which, on its face,
continues to criminalize only forcible rape.2
1. U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANuAL 22-100, ARMY LEADERSHIP: BE, KNOW, DO 1-15
(31 Aug. 1999) (quoting Colonel (COL) Albert G. Jenkins, CSA) [hereinafter FM 22-1001.
2. The Uniform Code of Military Justice proscribes criminal behavior in the armed
services according to a list of punitive articles. The article devoted to delineating the
elements of rape law is Article 120: "Rape and carnal knowledge." UCMJ art. 120 (2000). The
UCMJ is codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950 (2000). As defined by Article 120, the elements of
rape are: "(a) That the accused committed an act of sexual intercourse; and (b) That the act
of sexual intercourse was done by force and without consent." See also MANUALFOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. IV, I 45a(a) (2002) [hereinafter MCM].
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Commentators have long recognized that a wide spectrum of
behavior exists capable of destroying resistance to, or willingness
to resist to, unwanted sexual contact almost as effectively as the
direct application of force. The military's definition of rape remains
unchanged, however, and is almost indistinguishable from the
traditional common law crime described over two hundred years
ago.3 The result is a gap left by the UCMJ large enough to include
a wide variety of destructive behavior. Coercive activity that does
not fit Article 120's narrow definition of rape can be addressed only
by other assorted articles that impose mild punishment relative to
the blameworthiness of the underlying act.4 The dilemma created
by this gap is twofold: military panels may convict someone of rape
under Article 120 out of a desire to hold the defendant criminally
accountable for his5 reprehensible actions, despite the fact his
conduct did not amount to force or even forcible coercion;6 on the
other hand, panel members may acquit a person who illegitimately
used his authority to pressure a subordinate into having sex, simply
because it does not fit within the paradigm of forcible rape. Either
outcome is possible under the current state of the law, and both
outcomes are disastrous.
The misuse of rank or authority to coerce sex fits neatly into the
gap in the UCMJ. The elements required for rape may be absent,
yet the pressures exerted can be equally destructive of human
dignity and personal autonomy. It is particularly dangerous in the
military, where such egregious abuses of authority not only destroy
the personal interests of the victim, but also undermine discipline,
morale, and unit cohesiveness-all of the legitimate objectives of
3. At common law, rape was defined as "the unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman
forcibly and against her will." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210.
4. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
5. The author's use of pronouns in such situations that describe a suspected rapist
reflects the statistical factuality that most rape victims are women, and their attackers men.
In other places, the pronouns "he" or "she" are used in a generic fashion, without restricting
the meaning to a specific gender.
6. Such a defendant in a court-martial may be in peril ofnot only his liberty, but his life;
the severity of the punishment for rape in the military can be as much as death or life in
prison. See MCM, supra note 2, pt. IV, I 45e(1). The death penalty is still applicable in
certain cases in keeping with the Supreme Court's decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
598-99 (1977), which held that the death penalty was an unconstitutional punishment for the
crime of rape absent aggravating factors. See also infra note 127.
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military authority. Thus, in a larger sense, both the individual and
the community have been victimized.
Recognizing the destructive effects of coerced sex, military courts
have begun shoehorning into their rape analysis factors that bear
no relevance to the elements of forcible rape.7 Such judicial activism
is not the answer, but should instead serve as a signal to Congress
that military rape law needs to change.
This Note argues that Article 120 fails to accomplish its goal of
protecting the autonomy and privacy interests of the victim not
because its definition of rape is inherently flawed, but because it
exists in a vacuum. By itself, the definition of rape, especially as
conceived of by the UCMJ, cannot legitimately be extended to
encompass other forms of culpable coercion. Courts attempting to
do so have strained Article 120 beyond its meaning and have
threatened to destroy any meaningful analysis of criminal sexual
conduct in the military. The solution is clear: retain the principled
distinction between forcible rape and all other forms of coercive sex,
while creating separate crimes to cover those instances of nonvio-
lent coercion that are equally capable of robbing women of their
autonomy and privacy.
Perceiving the need for a more reasoned and comprehensive
approach to setting limits on behavior designed to achieve sexual
relations can only begin with an understanding of common law
rape. Part I of this Note reviews the elements of rape and how
military courts and commentators have understood them. This Part
ends with a discussion of the expansion of military rape law, from
beneficial reforms and exceptions to the dangerous threshold upon
which it now stands.
Having framed the issue in terms of rape law's traditional
roots, its evolution, and its expansion, Part II explains why sex
procured by deceit as well as sex procured by nonviolent coer-
cion-such as the coercion present through the misuse of rank-are
not, and should not be, considered rape. A principled distinction
exists between compelled sex and coerced or fraudulently induced
sex. An analysis of the pressures exerted by the accused to achieve
sexual intercourse will both restrain the overexpansion of rape and
provide a sound basis for measuring the wrongdoer's culpability.
7. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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This Part continues by describing how the misuse of military
authority can seriously degrade combat effectiveness. 8 Part II ends
by emphasizing the importance of criminalizing coercive sex
outside the limits of rape law, especially in light of the failure of
the UCMJ in the recent widespread allegations of sexual miscon-
duct at the Air Force Academy.9 The call to revise the UCMJ's
treatment of criminal sexual misconduct is not a new one, but the
focus has frequently been misguided, choosing to expand rape law
to cover other forms of nonviolent coercion rather than supplement-
ing rape law with additional criminal sexual misconduct statutes.
To that end, this Note proposes adding another Article to the
UCMJ, as well as revising the existing Article 120.
Part III analyzes this new continuum of culpability. This analysis
provides the basis for a new punitive scheme, filling the gap in
Article 120 by providing different criminal sanctions for rape and
the newly delineated sexual offenses.
Answering this critical need will allow commanders to punish
and deter leaders who would abuse their position, as well as
legitimize the chain of command and remove impediments to
mission success. Our nation, embroiled in war abroad and defend-
ing domestic security at home, needs the military to focus on the
enemy without rather than the enemy within.
I. THE CRIME AND THE LAW
Two of the most cherished liberties in society, particularly
coveted in American culture, are personal autonomy and privacy.
It is the violation of these prized freedoms which makes rape such
a despicable crime. Sexual intimacy lies at the heart of privacy, and
sexual autonomy is equally central to a person's dignity.0
8. The emphasis on the effect of coercive sexual practices on combat effectiveness
recognizes that the ultimate result of sexual violence and coercion is a breakdown of military
discipline. While such activity in a theater of operations would have an obvious, immediate,
and profound impact on combat effectiveness, this can also be true when it occurs in a
peacetime force or one that is not in the field, by disrupting training, maintenance and
preparation for deployment.
9. See infra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
10. Professor Stephen Schulhofer approaches the study of sexual crime from the
perspective of this important liberty interest:
We take for granted, as birthrights, our control over our property, our labor,
2428 [Vol. 45:2425
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Some commentators have described rape as a crime against
property" as well as a crime of violence against a person. The
notion that something has been stolen from the victim of rape is not
uncommon among commentators, and thus some even argue for
protections in the law based on similar rationales as those provided
for extortion or robbery. 12 In any case, the crime of rape as charged
under the UCMJ should be understood both in terms of its tradi-
tional legal evolution and its place in the unique environment of the
military services.
A. The Crime
In the government's efforts to safeguard these essential personal
liberties, Congress has proscribed certain conduct that is injurious
to society and thus labeled it "unlawful."3 Declaring certain acts
criminal has one all-encompassing goal: protecting the public from
and our personal privacy. But we also know that these rights have to be
defined, nurtured, and supported by law. Sexual autonomy is no less important.
Like the other core interests of a free person, sexual autonomy deserves to be
respected as a genuine entitlement, fully protected in its own right.
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE
OF LAW 113 (1998).
11. See Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence
of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1781 (1992) (observing that the
rape of virgins had "unmistakable characteristics of a crime against property").
12. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1182 (1986) ("lIlt would be a
significant improvement if the law of rape in any state prohibited exactly the same threats
as that state's law of extortion and exactly the same deceptions as that state's law of false
pretenses or fraud."). It would be better instead, as argued below, that such instances of
"extortion" and "deception" be addressed not in terms of rape law, but in terms of what they
are--criminal sexual impositions of a different nature. See discussion infra Part II.B.
13. When citizens, through their representative government, label an activity unlawful,
they have made a judgment that the particular activity harms both individual victims and
society as a whole. Otherwise, redress for the injury would be available simply as a private
action in the civil courts.
Wrongs are divisible into two sorts or species; private wrongs, and public
wrongs. The former are an infringement or privation of the private or civil
rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals; and are thereupon
frequently termed civil injuries: the latter are a breach and violation of public
rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a
community; and are distinguished by the harsher appellation of crimes and
misdemeanors.
3 WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
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further occurrences of such conduct.14 By proscribing rape, society
has traditionally regarded the forcible imposition of unwanted sex
upon another to be such a social wrong. Put simply, society has
decided to prohibit otherwise lawful activity (sexual intercourse)
pursued in a violent and compulsive manner.
The harm of rape can be measured in terms of each of the three
traditional common law elements of the crime: (1) sexual inter-
course, (2) accomplished by force, and (3) against the will of the
woman. 5 The harm in unwanted sexual intercourse is a loss of
dignity, personal integrity, and honor. The harm that results from
force almost goes without saying; physical harm can be easily seen
in the victim's injuries. The psychological effects of being brutalized,
of having one's will completely overwhelmed and subdued, can
endure long after the physical pain fades.
The victim may be robbed of her privacy twofold: first, she is
deprived of her most private choices-with whom, and under what
circumstances, she shares herself; second, her past secrets may be
laid bare, dragged into the courtroom to become part of a trial and
thus made into a public record. 16 The accused faces similar exposure
and examination, something for which one may not have much
sympathy if his actions are laterjudged to be criminal. In the event
he turns out to be innocent, however, one may have more empathy
for the doubt sown into his character by the mere accusation of such
14. The central aim of each rationale for sentencing a person convicted of a crime is to
shield society from further transgressions of that nature, either by the criminal being
sentenced or others who would perpetrate the same wrongs.
[Olur society recognizes five principal reasons for the sentence of those who
violate the law. They are rehabilitation of the wrongdoer, punishment of the
wrongdoer, protection of society from the wrongdoer, preservation of good order
and discipline in the military, and deterrence of the wrongdoer and those who
know of his/her crime(s) and his/her sentence from committing the same or
similar offenses.
U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-9, LEGAL SERVICES: MILITARYJUDGEs' BENCHBOOK 90 (15 Sept.
2002) [hereinafter BENCHBOOKI.
15. See supra note 3. Common law rape can be properly labeled forcible rape, as it did not
traditionally criminalize coercive behavior resulting from nonviolent action.
16. It may be argued that the crime of rape does not cause this second loss of privacy. A
woman who is raped but who never reports it does not suffer this loss. She has, however,
merely traded one harm for another; choosing the isolation of silent suffering over exposing
herself to examination by authorities. In this way, rape has harmed the victim by creating
this potential exposure whether she reports the crime or not.
[Vol. 45:24252430
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a reprehensible act. Even the allegation of rape thus calls the honor
and integrity of both accused and accuser into question."7
B. The Law
The military's definition of rape is a very simple one, almost
indistinguishable from the traditional common law crime Sir
William Blackstone described. 8 The military's version has two
stated elements: (1) sexual intercourse, accomplished (2) by force
and without consent of the victim. 9
Although remarkably similar to traditional common law rape,
two of the elements are stated as one. The combination of the force
and consent elements of the crime undoubtedly reflects the common
understanding that force and nonconsent are entwined very closely
in terms of evidentiary proof.20 This is really a technical, organiza-
tional difference that some courts choose to ignore; some military
courts, however, have stated openly that they view the require-
ments of force and lack of consent as distinct from one another.2 '
It makes sense that lack of consent is an element of rape separate
and distinct from force. Physically violent sex is not, by itself,
criminal behavior; the government has not chosen to interfere so
substantially in our private matters as to dictate the "gentleness"
of sexual intimacy, only to proscribe its violent imposition upon the
17. When victims have not been severely beaten, or there is little forensic evidence of the
forcefulness of the encounter, the strategies of the defense and prosecution invariably turn
to attacking each other's version of the truth.
She gives her version and he gives his. If you are the defense attorney, your job
is to convince the jury not to believe what she says-which means that the only
way to defend may be to destroy the credibility of the victim.
The key question in many acquaintance rape cases today thus becomes not
what counts as rape but rather what we need to know about the victim, and the
defendant, in order to decide who is telling the truth.
Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 509, 517 (1992).
18. See supra notes 3, 15.
19. UCMJ art. 120 (2000).
20. This concept stems from the relationship between the two: the vigor of a victim's
refusal is most clearly demonstrated by the force necessary to overcome her will. For a
discussion of this relationship, and the reasons for its persistence in the law, see generally
Dripps, supra note 11.
21. See United States v. Simpson, 55 M.J. 674,707 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2001), affd, 58 M.J.
368 (C.A.A.F. 2003).
2004] 2431
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unwilling.22 The military has said little about consent outside the
context of the force applied to nullify it. It is clear, however, that
lack of consent must be affirmatively shown.23 It is not enough for
a victim to say after the act has occurred that she did not want to
have sex: The military's highest court-the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces-found it significant in one case that
"although [the victim] did not actually want to have sexual
intercourse with appellant or [another man], she did not indicate
that to either of them."
The fact that a victim must manifest her lack of consent clearly
raises a question that has been the subject of a long-standing
debate in the area of rape: How clearly must she express herself?
To the point of resistance?25 Although the Manual for Courts-
Martial (MCM) states that a victim's failure to "make lack of
consent reasonably manifest by taking such measures of resistance
as are called for by the circumstances" 28 can give rise to an infer-
ence that the victim actually consented, the courts have stated that
resistance is not the only means to show lack of consent.27
22. Susan Estrich makes the point that "even force that goes far beyond the physical
contact necessary to accomplish penetration-is not itself prohibited. Rather, what is
required, and prohibited, is force used to overcome female nonconsent." Estrich, supra note
12, at 1107. Professor LaFave likewise notes that "Itihe interplay of the force requirement
with the notion of physical resistance highlights the need for recognition that nonconsent can
be sufficiently manifested in other ways." 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Sco'ir, JR.,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIhINAL LAW § 7.19 (1986 & Supp. 2003).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Tollinchi, 54 M.J. 80,83 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (emphasizing that
"[elven if [the alleged victim] did not actually consent, there was no way for appellant to
know that she did not consent").
24. United States v. Fuller, 54 M.J. 107, 110 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (remarking that the victim
"did not say 'no,' nor did she attempt to stop the sexual activities").
25. See Major Timothy W. Murphy, A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 A.F.
L. REV. 19,29 (1996) (arguing that the Court of Military Appeals "eliminated any per se rule
requiring a victim to resist"). But see Captain Brian D. Bailey, Does Rape Require
Resistance?, ARMYLAW., Mar. 1991, at 9, 12 (concluding that "[aibsent some demonstration
of violence by the man, the force element of rape legally should require an effort by the
woman to resist. Otherwise, the crime of rape will have broken completely from its original
meaning to encompass any sex that a man negligently fails to perceive as unwanted").
26. MCM, supra note 2, pt. IV, I 45c(1)(b).
27. See United States v. Watson, 31 M.J. 49,52 (C.M.A. 1990) (emphatically rejecting the
lower court's imposition of a resistance requirement, stating: "It is bewildering, admittedly,
how the military judge could seemingly have found such an independent, affirmative duty
on the part of a rape victim"). The court went on to deny that the MCM could be read to
require resistance, holding the MCM reference, supra note 26, to be "mere commentary."
Watson, 31 M.J. at 52.
2432
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The concept of force in rape is much more straightforward; the
military has adopted Black's Law Dictionary's definition of"force":2
"n. Power, violence, or pressure directed against a person or
thing;"29 and "vb. To compel by physical means....""
Article 120 does not define how much force is required. Commen-
tators generally have agreed that the only amount of force required
is "force used to overcome female nonconsent."3' The lower limit of
actual force is that it must be greater than "that merely incidental
to the act of sexual intercourse.... [The force] element contemplates
an application of force to overcome the victim's will and capacity to
resist."
2
In cases where consent cannot be given, either because of the
perpetrator's actions or circumstances the perpetrator takes
advantage of, the law finds sufficient force in the act of sexual
intercourse itself. In these situations, the perpetrator will not have
to force himself upon his victim physically because the victim was
unconscious, under the influence of alcohol or drugs,33 or mentally
unable to understand or make choices freely due to a disability. 4
In these cases the doctrine of constructive force serves as a
substitute for actual force, eliminating the need to prove that force
was actually applied to the victim to make her submit to sexual
contact.
Constructive force also comes into play when the perpetrator did
not have to apply force to achieve sexual contact because the victim
reasonably and subjectively believed any resistance would be
28. See BENCHBOOK, supra note 14, at 447.
29. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 656 (7th ed. 1999).
30. Id. at 657.
31. Estrich, supra note 12, at 1107; see also United States v. Bonano-Torres, 31 M.J. 175,
179 (C.M.A. 1990) (defining "the requisite force in terms of the force necessary to overcome
the victim's resistance") (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
32. Bonano-Torres, 31 M.J. at 178 (quoting the lower court's opinion, 29 M.J. 849, 851
(A.C.M.R. 1989) and citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 597).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Mathai, 34 M.J. 33, 34,36 (C.M.A. 1992) (stating that when
the victim is unconscious from excessive drinking and that "the evidence shows that she did
not consent to sexual intercourse with appellant while she was conscious, there can be no
implied consent by reason ofher inability to reject appellant's advances while unconscious").
34. See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 33 M.J. 543,544,548 (A-C.M.R. 1991), affd, 36 M.J.
183 (C.M.A. 1992) (finding that the victim who was deaf, mute, and whose mental age was
that of a three- to five-year-old child was incapable of giving legally effective consent).
20041 2433
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futile. 5 This exception is made for the sound policy reason that
when the defendant's own conduct creates a threat of violence so
severe that resistance appears futile, the law should not require the
victim to bring greater harm upon herself by attempting to resist
anyway.
The victim's belief is tested for reasonableness "under the
totality of the circumstances." 6 Factors have traditionally in-
cluded: the relative size of the perpetrator and victim, demonstrat-
ing an apparent difference in physical power; 37 the reputation of
the perpetrator for violence, if known by the victim;38 a parental
relationship over the victim, 39 the rationale being that the applica-
tion of force by the parent was unnecessary because of the close
relationship and obvious physical control exerted on the child for
potentially long periods of time; the coerciveness of the perpetra-
tor's expressed intent to achieve sexual contact through physical
means or threat to meet any physical resistance with violent
retaliation; and the surroundings and timing of the incidents,"
including how isolated the location is and how likely assistance
would have responded to screams or calls for help."2
35. United States v. Clark, 35 M.J. 432, 435 (C.M.A. 1992) (holding that "no force is
needed to accomplish the rape beyond what is involved in the act ofintercourse itself because
the victim does not, or ceases to, resist because of a reasonable fear of death or grievous
bodily harm"); see also United States v. Hicks, 24 M.J. 3, 6 (C.M.A. 1987) (observing that
"constructive force may consist of expressed or implied threats of bodily harm") (citations
omitted).
36. Clark, 35 M.J. at 435; see also MCM, supra note 2, pt. IV, I 45c(1)(b).
37. See Clark, 35 M.J. at 433 ("Appellant is 5'8" in height and weighs approximately 210
pounds. In contrast, [the victim] is 5'5" in height and weighs approximately 120 pounds.").
38. See United States v. Simpson, 55 M.J. 674,707 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2001), affd, 58 M.J.
368 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (noting the defendant's "reputation in the unit for being tough and
mean").
39. See United States v. Palmer, 33 M.J. 7,9 (C.M.A. 1991) ("The youth and vulnerability
of children, coupled with the power inherent in a parent's position of authority, creates a
unique situation of dominance and control in which explicit threats and displays of force are
not necessary to effect the abuser's purpose." (quoting State v. Etheridge, 352 S.E.2d 673,681
(N.C. 1987)).
40. See Hicks, 24 M.J. at 6 (finding constructive force when defendant stated: "It doesn't
matter if you cooperate or not, I'm going to give it to you anyway.").
41. United States v. Bradley, 28 M.J. 197, 200 (C.M.A. 1989) (observing that the
defendant confronted the victim late at night in her home, knowing that the victim's husband
was away on post and unable to come home).
42. See Clark, 35 M.J. at 433 (noting that the defendant directed his subordinate inside
a small, unlit shed, followed her inside, and locked the door); Hicks, 24 M.J. at 6 (considering
2434
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Three hypothetical scenarios are conceivable when applying
constructive force analysis. In the first situation the perpetrator has
actually applied force, so any threats he made are beside the point.
The doctrine of constructive force would not apply, except to the
extent that further resistance from the victim is discouraged by
implication of future harm-implications conveyed by the perpetra-
tor's past willingness to exert actual force.
Another possibility is that the perpetrator has actually expressed
a threat of force.4" Constructive force analysis of the totality of the
circumstances would enable the factfinder to decide whether the
threat was reasonably taken as being coercive enough to make
resistance appear futile.
Finally, the perpetrator may not have expressed a threat of
force at all. The analysis of the totality of the circumstances would
enable the factfinder to decide whether the perpetrator's affirma-
tive actions, characteristics, and the surrounding circumstances
all reasonably implied a threat of force."" Ostensibly, this analysis
would also determine whether the implied threat was sufficiently
coercive to render resistance effectively futile.
The doctrine of constructive force is not a recent invention of a
modern, enlightened age; it has existed for more than a century.
While the military's official use of the doctrine dates to 1917,"5 the
concept evidently predates the turn of the century, appearing in
commentary as early as 1886.46 In the past ten to fifteen years,
however, the courts have been improperly adding factors to rape
analysis under the guise of constructive force.
C. The Expansion of Constructive Force Analysis
The most troubling of these factors that the courts, particularly
the highest military court, have injected into constructive force
analysis is that of rank or authority. This dubious practice began in
the fact that the "victim was unfamiliar with the area and felt she had nowhere to run for
safety").
43. See, e.g., Hicks, 24 M.J. at 6.
44. See, e.g., Clark, 35 M.J. at 433.
45. A MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, NINETY-SECOND ARTICLE OF WAR,
Pt. II, at 251 (1917).
46. See WILLIAMWINTHROP, MILITARYLAW AND PRECEDENTS 677-78 (G.P.O. 1920) (1886).
20041 2435
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1989, when the Court of Military Appeals-the military's court of
last resort at the time--considered the defendant's position as the
drill instructor for the victim's spouse in its calculation of construc-
tive force, stating: "this military relationship with its ancillary
implications for the dependent spouse created a unique situation
of dominance and control where explicit threats and display [sic]
of force by the military superior were not necessary."4v What is
even more troubling is that this part of the court's holding was
completely unnecessary, because it had already found that the
late-night encounter in an isolated trailer off post, as well as the
defendant's size and demeanor, was "highly coercive,"4 a holding
certainly sufficient to find the doctrine of constructive force
applicable.
Three years later, the court made clear that its consideration of
rank should not be dismissed as either a mistake or mere dicta,
concluding its opinion in United States v. Clark by emphasizing"the
unique situation of dominance and control presented by appellant's
superior rank and position."49 This trend has continued in several
recent rulings from the current incarnation of that court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF).5°
The court has lost sight of the fact that constructive force is a
substitute for actual force. As such, each factor is considered only
to the extent that it would contribute to determining whether
the perpetrator did not have to apply actual force because of the
victim's reasonable fear of death or bodily harm. All the surround-
ing circumstances, including characteristics of the perpetrator,
victim, location, and timing, are relevant only to establish the
victim's reasonable belief that resistance was physically futile, not
47. United States v. Bradley, 28 M.J. 197, 200 (C.M.A. 1989) (citations omitted).
48. See id.; see also Hicks, 24 M.J. at 6 (stating that the evidence demonstrated that
"faippellant was in a position of authority over the victim's boyfriend" but also demonstrated
that the "[a]ppellant created a coercive atmosphere").
49. Clark, 35 M.J. at 436.
50. See United States v. Fuller, 54 M.J. 107, 111 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (stating that the court
was "sensitive to the fact that appellant was a superior noncommissioned officer, and [the
victim's] platoon sergeant, and that such a relationship can create a 'unique situation of
dominance and control') (citations omitted); accord United States v. Johnson, 54 M.J. 67, 69
(C.A.A.F. 2000).
2436 [Vol. 45:2425
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that the victim experienced a generalized "feeling of coerciveness"
of the encounter.5 1
The only coercion of legal significance in a rape case should be
that which may result from physical or violent compulsion. This is
simply not true for factors such as (1) rank, or military authority;52
(2) command authority;" (3) reputation in the unit for being
intolerant of failure or overly demanding; or (4) threats of push-ups
or other corrective training.5 4 None of these factors bear any
relevance to determining whether someone was coerced "forcibly,"
because a threat of force cannot be reasonably inferred from them.
The first two factors, military and command authority, do not grant
the senior person rights to assault or mistreat the subordinate. Nor
in fact do they suggest that the senior person would have any more
propensity or physical ability to do so. Indeed, it would take an
extreme extension of logic to say that because my commander can
order me to climb that ridge into hostile fire, he can therefore beat
me, or rape me, or that he would be more likely to do so. The other
two factors, the reputation for being intolerant of failure or overly
demanding, combined with presence of threats of physical training,
plainly do not include forcible sexual compulsion, because there is
no force inherently implied in either.
51. The military panel instructions reflect this important understanding of the proper
consideration of rank:
You may consider this evidence in deciding whether [the alleged victim] had a
reasonable belief that death or great bodily harm would be inflicted on her and
that (further) resistance would be futile. This evidence is also part of the
surrounding circumstances you may consider in deciding whether [the alleged
victim] consented to the act of sexual intercourse.
BENCHBOOK, supra note 14, at 431 (emphasis added).
52. "General military authority originates in oaths of office, law, rank structure,
traditions, and regulations" and is employed by leaders and supervisors "when they issue
orders to direct and control their subordinates." FM 22-100, supra note 1, at A-11, A-12.
53. Command authority is different than general military authority. It "originates with
the president and may be supplemented by law or regulation," and is employed by
commanders "by virtue of rank or assignment." Id. at A-9. The most marked difference
between those who exercise general military authority and those who exercise command
authority is the special responsibility that a commander has for both the well-being and
conduct of his subordinates.
54. In one recent case, United States v. Simpson, 55 M.J. 674 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2001),
affd, 58 M.J. 368 (C.A.A.F. 2003), the court's analysis included three of these factors: "[the
defendant's] reputation in the unit for being tough and mean ... his position as a
noncommissioned officer ... [and] his actual and apparent authority over each of the victims
in matters other than sexual contact." Id. at 707.
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If superior rank and position were enough to invoke the doctrine
of constructive force, then, as one Court of Military Appeals judge
stated, "all of the significant number of sexual fraternization cases
that reach this Court could conceivably come here as rape convic-
tions rather than fraternizations.""5
By adding factors that are clearly extraneous to forcible rape
analysis, the courts have manifestly signaled their desire to
include more than just forcible compulsion into the realm of
criminally accountable behavior. Judge Brown admitted as much
in his concurring opinion in Simpson, asserting: "I don't believe
this constitutes constructive force as defined by our superior
court. In my view, it should .... Until and unless Congress ... decides
to overhaul the [military's] current sexual crime scheme, that is the
approach that our superior court should take."56
The consideration of rank as a factor in constructive force
analysis has now been cemented in the military common law. Late
last year, the CAAF affirmed the service court's decision in
Simpson, stating "we have held that it is sufficient if the Govern-
ment proves that the abuse of authority placed the victim in fear of
physical injury."57 This statement, though seemingly restating the
law in Palmer,58 takes a legitimate factor of constructive force
analysis-that of the "unique situation of dominance and control"59
inherent in parent-child relationships-and applies it to superior-
subordinate relationships.
The CAAF expanded and applied the narrow holding in Palmer
to the facts in Simpson, clearly adopting military authority or
power as a factor in the constructive force analysis, by affirming the
military judge's instruction summarizing constructive force:
55. United States v. Clark, 35 M.J. 432,436 (C.M.A. 1992) (Wiss, J., concurring). While
it is "conceivable," it is arguably unlikely that a rape conviction could be founded solely on
rank in a fraternization scenario. It is not far-fetched, however, given the CAAF's later
rulings. See infra text accompanying note 57.
56. Simpson, 55 M.J. at 710-11 (Brown, J., concurring).
57. United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368,378-79 (C.A.A.F. 2003), affg 55 M.J. 674 (A.
Ct. Crim. App. 2001). One of the questions put to the court for review was whether the
military judge committed plain error by giving a panel instruction that differed from the one
in the Benchbook, as discussed supra note 51. See Simpson, 58 M.J. at 378.
58. United States v. Palmer, 33 M.J. 7 (C.M.A. 1991); see also supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
59. Palmer, 33 M.J. at 9.
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[Florce [is] required for the crime of rape ... it could be in the
form of constructive force, and that constructive force could be
brought to bear on the victim through the use or abuse of
military authority that created a reasonable belief that the
victim would suffer physical injury or that resistance would be
futile.6 °
The assertion that the "use or abuse of military authority" could
amount to constructive force is an expansion both unwarranted and
illogical. The rationale for the use of authority in constructive
force analysis arose from parent-child relationships, and results
from the convergence of two factors: (1) the "youth and vulnerabil-
ity of children;" and (2) the "power inherent in a parent's position
of authority."6 2 To apply these concepts to superior-subordinate
relationships requires the presumption that soldiers are to their
leaders as children are to their parents-but soldiers are not and
cannot be children; they must have reached the age of majority
to serve. In addition, soldiers do not have a child's mental and
emotional vulnerability to coercion; children's unique situation of
vulnerability comes from their utter dependency on their parents
for everything up to life sustenance, as well as their prolonged
exposure to the total authority of their parents63 -exposure that
lasts all of their formative years. The Palmer court even stated as
much; the situation created by a child's vulnerability and a parent's
unparalleled authority was "unique.
" 64
If the lower courts read the CAAF's holding strictly, the expan-
sion of constructive force may still be held in check. After all,
reading the CAAF's holding literally keeps it in line with traditional
constructive force analysis: To the extent that a perpetrator's
"abuse of authority place[s] the victim in fear of physical injury,""
the perpetrator has applied coercive force in the form of implied
60. Simpson, 58 M.J. at 379.
61. Palmer, 33 M.J. at 9.
62. Id.
63. Prolonged and continual exertions of parental authority were a focus in both Palmer
and United States v. DeJonge, 16 M.J. 974 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983).
64. Palmer, 33 M.J. at 9.
65. Simpson, 58 M.J. at 378-79 (emphasis added).
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threat of violence. This situation should remain safely hypothetical
as authority can in no way logically imply a threat of force.6
II. THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. Reveille:6  Arise, and Witness Injustice
The source of the court's dilemma is the UCMJ itself. Article
120 criminalizes only forcible rape, providing no related crimes or
lesser-included offenses that cover nonviolent coercive conduct (e.g.,
threats of nonviolent reprisal such as an unfavorable performance
review).6" In an attempt to compensate, government counsel may
charge a defendant with violating Article 93 "Cruelty and maltreat-
ment," along with rape. This Article may well be used to cover
nonviolent coercive sex," but in realistic terms the punishment is
"peanuts" compared to rape, imposing at most one year of confine-
ment.7 8
66. Military authority does not confer any more ability (as great strength or comparative
size would) or signal a propensity to harm (as a violent demeanor or past behavior would) a
person in a subordinate military position. See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
67. A reveille is a "morning signal given to soldiers, usually by beat of drum or by
bugle, to waken them and notify that it is time to rise." 13 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
812 (2d ed. 1989). Today, reveille accompanies the raising of the national colors.
68. UCMJ Article 120(d) enumerates lesser-included offenses for rape covering
unconsummated or failed acts of forcible rape: "assault [and] assault consummated by a
battery," id.; "assault with intent to commit rape," id. art. 134; "indecent assault," id.;
"attempts," id. art. 80; and "carnal knowledge," id. art. 120(b). See also MCM, supra note 2,
pt. IV, I 45d. None of these crimes would cover forms of coercion that did not involve force
and/or a reasonably implied threat of force.
69. The explanation of the offense of cruelty and maltreatment specifies: "[Slexual
harassment may constitute this offense. Sexual harassment includes influencing, offering
to influence, or threatening the career, pay, or job of another person in exchange for sexual
favors .... " MCM, supra note 2, pt. IV, 17c(2). It is important to note that further
explanation of Article 93 clarifies that sexual harassment is included because "some forms
of such conduct are nonphysical maltreatment." Id. at A23-6; cf. U.S. DEPT OF ARMY, REG.
600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY para. 7-5(c) (13 May 2002) (stating a policy assessment that
"[slexual assault and rape ... may be extreme forms of sexual harassment"). In legal analysis,
however, sexual coercion may indeed be an extreme form of sexual harassment, while rape
or assault cannot. See infra text accompanying notes 77-82 (differentiating between physical
compulsion, coercion, and persuasion as means of obtaining sex).
70. MCM, supra note 2, pt. IV, I 17e.
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As a result, courts and panel members are cast adrift without
legal standards, hearing a sordid tale of unjustifiable pressures to
procure sex from a female soldier and having to choose between
straining to fit the accused's conduct into the paradigm of tradi-
tional forcible rape, finding him guilty of cruelty and maltreatment
("peanuts"), or simply letting him off entirely.
This predicament causes the court-martial to fall short of
securing justice for the victim because the panel may be unwilling
to brand the nonviolent defendant a "rapist." When the culpable go
free, the justice system has failed to achieve any of the goals for
sentencing.
This situation may yield unfair results for the defendant as well.
The panel may be unwilling to fail in its responsibility to protect
society, deciding instead to implement its only potent option:
convicting the defendant of rape. If he neither used force, nor
threatened the use thereof, a terrible injustice has been done'.7 The
innocent, at least he who is innocent of forcible rape, is branded a
"rapist," and placed in risk of being incarcerated for the majority of,
if not the entirety of, the rest of his life. In this situation, too, the
justice system has again failed to achieve many of the goals for
sentencing.72
B. Charge!:73 Explicitly Criminalize More Forms of Coercive Sex
That the touchstone of rape analysis is the presence of force or
forcible compulsion makes sense: "Rape is, after all, the ultimate
form of aggression against someone-short of homicide."74 This type
71. The worst type of injustice has in fact occurred; that of a government, whose purpose
it is to ensure the freedom of its citizens, imprisoning one of them for a crime he did not
actually commit.
72. It is likely that the wrongdoer convicted of the more serious crime of rape, but who
is factually guilty of a less culpable act, may face disproportionate punishment. The goal of
rehabilitation may certainly suffer as well.
73. Another traditional command in battle, the call to "charge" was a call to action. It
roused soldiers to "rush against or upon, with all one's force, in a hostile way." 3 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 39 (2d ed. 1989).
74. T.S. NELSON, FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: CONFRONTING RAPE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN THE U.S. MILITARY 66 (2002); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) ("Short
of homicide, [rape] is the 'ultimate violation of self.'" (quoting U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN. RPT., RAPE AND ITS VICTIMS: A REPORT FOR CITIZENS,
HEALTH FACILITIES, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 1 (1975))).
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of analysis may serve to narrow the focus of criminal culpability to
only one of the harmful aspects of rape (violence), completely
ignoring the effects on the other (loss of autonomy). As Professor
Schulhofer notes:
Recognition of sexual autonomy as a fully protected entitlement
suggests a different approach to this problem. All coercive
behavior, whether violent or nonviolent, seeks to induce sexual
intimacy that the coerced individual would not otherwise choose.
A person violates another person's autonomy-and therefore
should be considered guilty of sexual abuse-whenever he
attempts to engage in sexual intercourse with consent that was
obtained by coercion. v5
It is important to note that Professor Schulhofer labels such
coercive behavior "sexual abuse," not "rape."
Other commentators have expressed the view that coercion can
serve to destroy sexual autonomy as effectively as force.7" That is
not to say that such coercive conduct is as criminally culpable as
rape. As Professor Dripps succinctly stated: "[Wihether measured
by the welfare or by the dignity of the victim, as a general matter
unwanted sex is not as bad as violence.... [Ilt follows that those who
press sexual advances in the face of refusal act less wickedly than
those who shoot, or slash, or batter."77 What benefit is there,
though, to pigeonholing behaviors into one or the other camp? The
answer is that there is more than a semantic difference between
coercive sexual practices and rape, which should be reflected in any
statutory scheme designed to address this problem.
The analysis can be framed in terms of the legitimacy of the
pressures exerted by the perpetrator, and how that reflects the level
of imposition on the autonomy of the victim. Specifically, what
alternatives has she been left with as a result of the perpetrator's
actions? The choice actually made by the victim is irrelevant to the
75. SCHULHOFER, supra note 10, at 115.
76. See, e.g., Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REv.
39 (1998). Although the author attaches the label of "rape" to sex procured by fraud or
coercion, she admits that it "may be inconsistent with dictionary definitions, potentially
trivialize forcible rape, and inaccurately reflect current statutory enactments." Id. at 47-48.
This author agrees.
77. Dripps, supra note 11, at 1801.
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culpability of the perpetrator; we should be concerned only with the
relative legitimacy of the alternatives left.
It may help to draw some distinctions between types of pressures
that the perpetrator can bring to bear on the victim. For simplicity's
sake, this Note labels them compulsion, coercion, and persuasion.
Compulsion is the equivalent to hijacking the will of the victim,
leaving no alternatives (no real choice). When an attacker leaps
from the darkness to seize his victim, he has left no choice in the
victim but the manner and extent to which she will resist him to try
to stay alive. The attacker has declared his intention to use any and
all means to achieve his goals. This is rape, and the attacker should
certainly be considered culpable.
Coercion is pressure upon the will of the victim by virtue of an
illegitimate choice-the choice between two evils of the perpetra-
tor's making. Such a threat as "submit to sex or I will beat you or
punish you" is clearly wrongful because the victim has a right to be
free from both the unwanted sex and physical savagery. Both
possibilities are harmful and both are the result of the perpetrator's
actions. "Courts often treat a choice as coerced only if two condi-
tions are met: The choice must be made in response to a threat ...
and the person receiving the threat must have 'no reasonable
alternative' but to submit."78 This is rape if the coercive threat is of
violence or force. If not, it is not rape but the actor should certainly
be criminally culpable79 unless the threat is trivial.
80
Persuasion is pressure upon the will of the victim by virtue of a
promise of gain. It is the choice between an evil compensated by a
gain or no change from the status quo. An offer such as "sleep with
me and I will give you money or a recommendation for employment"
is one of persuasion rather than coercion-it is essentially an offer
of potential gain, not a threat of potential loss. The choice remains
purely voluntary; choosing to refuse sex in this situation leaves
78. SCHULHOFER, supra note 10, at 126. Some argue that this is the reason that there
should be protections in the law for sexual autonomy on similar rationales as those for
extortion or robbery. See Estrich, supra note 12, at 1182.
79. This situation, in which a perpetrator has coerced the victim into unwanted sexual
contact without the threat of physical harm, is the gap left by the UCMJ and the focus of this
Note's revised statute. See infra Part III.B.
80. In other words, if the threat would not overcome what society assumes is the natural
reluctance to engage in unwanted sex, it is "trivial"-an objective standard. See infra note
125.
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the offeree no worse off than she was before the offer was made.
Consent has been given not for sexual gratification, but the
achievement of some other perceived gain. One who has made the
choice to accept the offer can be understood to have decided that
the undesirability of the sexual contact has been mitigated or
eliminated by the gain of the return promise. This type of exchange
should not be considered criminal sexual imposition,8 ' because
autonomy has not been destroyed, or even reduced, as in the
previous examples. 2
This form of analysis really turns on the element of consent,
using force only to indicate the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted
on the victim. Sex without voluntary consent-the lack of consent
inherent in compulsion and the involuntary consent given as a
result of coercion-should be criminal.
Some argue that fraudulently procured sex should be equated
to rape."3 The military does not subscribe to such a radical view: "If
there is actual consent, although obtained by fraud, the act is not
rape .84 As well it should not be; the concept of consent is one
based upon autonomy, and an after-the-fact reflection cannot
change whether an act was done willingly at the time it was
performed.
Scholars frequently subdivide fraud into fraud in the factum and
fraud in the inducement. 5 The distinction concerns the scope, and
thus effectiveness, of consent. In the first instance, when there is
fraud in the factum, the perpetrator has deceived the victim so as
to render her consent ineffective, because the action she consented
81. Such activity may, in fact, be chargeable as either sexual harassment or solicitation
to commit prostitution, but those crimes are adequately addressed elsewhere in military law.
See UCMJ art. 93 (2000); id. art. 134.
82. But see JoAnn L. Miller, Prostitution in Contemporary American Society, in SEXUAL
COERCION: A SOURCEBOOK ON ITS NATURE, CAUSES, AND PREVENTION 45, 57 n.5 (Elizabeth
Grauerholz & Mary Koralewski eds., 1991) [hereinafter SEXUALCOERCION] (arguing that "the
prostitute's 'choice' is no more of a voluntary choice than the prisoner's 'choice' to participate
in a prison psychotherapy program that will reduce the length of incarceration"). Although
the idea that a woman becomes a prostitute as a result of socioeconomic pressures and is
thus "coerced" into having intercourse is intriguing as a sociological concept, it is unhelpful
for assigning criminal culpability to a specific actor.
83. See Falk, supra note 76, at 45.
84. MCM, supra note 2, pt. IV, I 45c(1)(b).
85. See, e.g., LAFAVE & ScOrr, supra note 22, § 7.19(c); Joel Feinberg, Victims' Excuses:
The Case of Fraudulently Procured Consent, 96 ETICS 330, 331 (1986).
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to was not what occurred. Professor LaFave uses the example of a
doctor who "has had intercourse with the patient but has managed
to conceal from her the fact that it occurred by representing
the event as nothing more than a routine pelvic examination or
some similar treatment."86 The consent given to the doctor was for
treatment, not sexual intercourse, so her consent was ineffective.87
The other situation is fraud in the inducement, in which the "doctor
has achieved intercourse with his patient by fraudulently misrepre-
senting that such intercourse was a necessary medical treatment
for some real or pretended malady."8 In this case the consent was
to intercourse, but for a reason which was later shown to be false.89
The military's exclusion of fraud is aimed at this situation, and
comports with traditional notions of fraud and consent in rape
prosecutions: "Any woman, then, is protected by the criminal law
from the imposition of sexual relations without her consent, but in
general, women are not equally protected when their expression of
consent is involuntary by virtue of a mistaken motivating belief
produced by deception."90
This distinction is ultimately an artificial one, and is unnecessary
when analyzing sex gained by fraud in terms of autonomy. Another
way to look at the two previous examples is that in the first, rape
has occurred because consent to sex was never given, thus the
force required by the doctor was only that which was necessary to
achieve penetration. His deception removes the necessity of violent
action and then serves to conceal his crime. In the second example,
no rape has occurred because consent was actually given.
Fraudulent promises of benefit cannot be seen as giving rise to
criminal culpability in this context for the same reason that actual
promises do not-they are both persuasion, the transfer of contem-
plated benefits. The fraudulent nature of the promise does not serve
to destroy the effectiveness of the consent at the time it is given.
This may be true even if the deception is not about a future
occurrence, but a misrepresentation about a present fact, such as
identity:
86. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 22, § 7.19(c).
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Feinberg, supra note 85, at 333.
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Suppose B is an enthusiastic fan of the rock star Johnny Limbo.
She has heard all his records but has never seen his photo-
graphs. On learning of this, the villainous A proclaims that he
is Johnny Limbo and invites her to come to bed with him. The
ruse works, let us suppose, and now the question is how
involuntary was her consent for such purposes as determining
his criminal liability. If we consider this deception to be fraud in
the inducement, then the voluntariness of her consent is
reduced but to nowhere near the extreme of total involuntari-
ness, for its inducement was an envisaged good, not the avoid-
ance of a dreaded evil. Hence it had no coercive force.9'
Again, the fact that consent was actually given at the time of the
sexual encounter cannot be changed by an after-the-fact decision by
the victim.
While Article 120 criminalizes only the top of the spectrum,
compelled and forcibly coerced sex, an ideal statute would address
nonviolent coercion as a lesser form of criminal sexual conduct. On
the other hand, persuaded sex, fraudulent or otherwise, should be
left out of a punitive scheme entirely because while it may be
despicable, it would be more harmful to personal autonomy for the
government to intrude into this area of sexual conduct.
C. Taps:92 It's Long Past Time To Put This Problem to Bed
We have a tremendous problem. It's time to get our heads out of
the sand.93
The year 2003 may very well become known in military circles as
the year of the Air Force Academy sexual assault scandal. In
January, the Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. John Roche, received
an e-mail that had been initially sent to female cadets "asserting
91. Id. at 344.
92. The last bugle call of the day, taps is "a signal sounded on the drum or trumpet,
fifteen minutes after the tattoo, at which all lights in the soldiers' quarters are to be
extinguished." 17 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 623 (2d ed. 1989).
93. Lieutenant General John Rosa, Remarks at the Air Force Academy's Parents
Weekend (Aug. 29, 2003), quoted in Debbie Kubic, Rosa Speaks Candidly About Assault
Survey (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://www.aog-usafa.orgtArticle%20Archive/rosa
replies-candidly.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
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that there was a significant sexual assault problem at the United
States Air Force Academy that had been ignored by the Academy's
leadership."94 Dr. Roche charged the Air Force General Counsel,
Mary Walker, with conducting an exhaustive review of the Air
Force Academy (AFA) and its practices and procedures for handling
sexual assault complaints, preventing sexual misconduct, and legal
responses to reported incidents.95 The Working Group formed to
conduct this investigation reported a disturbing situation at the
Academy, stating: "[Tihe focus on sexual assault issues had varied
over time and lessened in recent years, and a number of culture and
process matters are problematic. Collectively, they produced a less
than optimal environment to deter and respond to sexual assault
or bring assailants to justice."96 Remarkably, however, the Working
Group "found no systemic acceptance of sexual assault at the
Academy, institutional avoidance of responsibility, or systemic
maltreatment of cadets who report sexual assault."97
Unwilling to await the report of an internal Air Force investiga-
tion, Congress launched its own investigation by creating an
independent panel to "study ... the policies, management and
organizational practices, and cultural elements of the [AFA] that
were conducive to allowing sexual misconduct (including sexual
assaults and rape) at the [Academy]. "98 The Panel delivered its
report in September, harshly criticizing the Working Group Report,
stating that the Air Force General Counsel attempted both to
"shield Air Force Headquarters from public criticism" and "avoid [
any reference to the responsibility of Air Force Headquarters for the
failure of leadership which occurred at the Academy."99
94. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. AIR FORCE, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP
CONCERNING THE DETERRENCE OF AND RESPONSE TO INCIDENTS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AT THE
U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY 1 (June 17,2003) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT], available
at http://www.af.mil/usafa report/usafg-report.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2004.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 165.
97. Id.
98. Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-11, §§ 501-
503, 117 Stat. 559, 609-10 (2003).
99. REPORT OF THE PANEL TO REVIEW SEXUAL MISCONDUCT ALLEGATIONSATTHE U.S. AIR
FORCE ACADEMY 4 (Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter PANEL REPORT], available at
http://www.usafa.af.mil/d20030922usafareportl.pdf (last visited Apr. 9,2004). This is in line
with what many believe was the true motivation of Congress in creating an independent
Panel: "The Fowler commission was formed in response to congressional demands that high-
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Although the reports disagreed on a number points, the impor-
tance of their findings, not to mention their very existence, was that
one of the military's premier institutions has had a significant
sexual misconduct problem for some time-as does the military
itself.100
1. Lessons from the Air Force Academy
It is well known that the Air Force, and its Academy, are not the
only military institutions to have faced scandals concerning sexual
misconduct. 1 ' This scandal, however, has particular meaning: (1)
it sends a clear "wake-up" signal to Congress, in an urgent and very
publicly observable manner that the opinions of military judges did
not, that military sex crime law needs revision; and (2) it may help
to explain, in the context of this Note's analysis, both why and how
it should change.
As the Working Group and Fowler Commission reports will
undoubtedly be studied in detail and for some time to come, the
reports have only begun to expose a pervasive problem in military
culture, both in administering justice in cases of sexual misconduct,
and in preventing future incidents. As noted in The Denver Post:
"The true story of sex crimes inside the [service] academies remains
ranking Air Force officials not escape punishment if they contributed to a culture at the
academy that punished rape victims for reporting." Mike Soraghan & Anne C. Mulkern,
Charges Rebutted in AFA Abuses, DENV. POST, Sept. 24, 2003, at Al.
100. The very purpose of the service academies is to train future officers--those who will
serve in the positions of most influence. It is logical to assume that those leaders who would
prey upon their peers at the academy would continue to abuse those over whom they exert
control once they graduate. If the problem is in fact a "culture of rape," as discussed infra,
that culture could be carried into the mainstream service by the leaders who escaped justice
at the AFA.
101. See Miles Moffeit & Amy Herdy, AFA Isn't Alone in Sex-Assault Controversy: Other
Military Academies Also Accused of Inadequate Response, DENV. POST, Apr. 6, 2003, at Al
(describing sexual assault allegations of current and former students at the United States
Military Academy and United States Naval Academy). See generally Anne G. Sadler et al.,
Factors Associated With Women's Risk of Rape in the Military Environment, 43 AM. J. INDUS.
MED. 262, 263 (2003) (articulating that "the goal of this exploratory study ... was to attempt
to identify workplace environmental factors associated with rape occurring during military
service"). Other sexual misconduct scandals that have rocked the services over the past
decade or so have included Tailhook (Navy), the Aberdeen Proving Ground drill sergeant
rape trials (Army), and the Sergeant Major of the Army sexual harassment, assault, and rape
trial (Army).
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largely hidden from public view. It's tucked into a secret world of
files and confidential proceedings, where sexual-assault cases are
treated as conduct breaches instead of criminal offenses and bring
no public embarrassment." 112 There is plenty of public embarrass-
ment to go around now that the scandal has broken; the Air Force
has already removed several of the senior leaders at the AFA, and
demoted the superintendent at his retirement.0 3 Such publicity has
both positive and negative impacts. An outcry of the people might
motivate their representatives to review, and hopefully change, the
factors contributing to prevalent sexual misconduct. Whether this
will occur remains to be seen. The negative impacts, however, have
already manifested themselves. The flood of journalism and its
attendant flock of "experts" has served to muddy the waters.0 4
Both the Working Group and Fowler Commission reported that
the use of alcohol, as well as other misconduct, frequently attended
incidents later alleged to be acts of rape or sexual assault.' ° This
finding is important, as it accentuates one of the common myths
about military rape law: that any amount of coercion, or consump-
tion of alcohol by the victim that influences consent also renders it
legally ineffective.
[Tihe Academy's definition broadly asserts "[clonsent is not
given where there is force, threat of force, coercion, or when the
102. Moffeit & Herdy, supra note 101.
103. See PANEL REPORT, supra note 99, at 35.
104. See, e.g., Miles Moffeit &Amy Herdy, Military Law on SexAssault 'Antiquated,'Many
Assert, DENY. POST, Apr. 13, 2003, at Al ("The [UCMJ] says that rape requires 'force.' But
the code does not cite other powerful influences, such as rank, that a rapist can use to
pressure or lure victims."); Editorial, Outdated Sex-Crime Laws Leave Military Women at
Risk, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 2003, at A12 (improperly using the terms "rape" and "sexual
assault" interchangeably when describing how civilian law reform has outpaced the military's
in the area of sexual misconduct).
105. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 94, at 96. The connection between alcohol,
its effect on judgment, and incidents of sexual misconduct was made clear:
In an opinion echoed by other Academy leaders, Major General Stephen Lorenz,
a former Commandant of Cadets, stated: "Ninety-five percent of all the alleged
sexual assaults that I dealt with when I was there were directly related to
alcohol...." The Working Group's review of allegations of sexual assault over the
last ten years indicated that at least 40% of investigated cadet-on-cadet
allegations involved the use of alcohol by the cadet suspect, the cadet victim, or
both.
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person is alcohol impaired, underage, or unconscious." This
misstates the law, as alcohol impairment short of intoxication
sufficient to render a person incapable of consent will not, alone,
negate consent.... To the extent that the definition implies that
having consumed alcohol and being impaired to any degree
negates consent, it is significantly misleading to cadets, and
likely to result in allegations of sexual assault under circum-
stances that would not meet criminal requirements.1"
This statement seems somewhat circular, stating in essence that
drinking short of the amount of alcohol needed to negate consent
does not negate consent. It serves to remind us that it takes more
than just any amount of drinking to vitiate consent, and it should
also remind us that it takes more than just any form of coercion
to do so as well. Failing to recognize this could "raise unrealistic
expectations for prosecution in the minds of victims."0 7 These kinds
of misconceptions about the law almost certainly affect the number
of people reporting rape and sexual assault in the surveys consid-
ered by the Working Group and Fowler Commission."8 Clarifying
the law of rape and other forms of sexual misconduct would bring
victims' expectations closer in line with the legal reality, as well as
providing them with greater justice.
Unlike many of the sexual misconduct scandals that the military
has experienced in the past, where the public has attacked the
conduct of particular leaders or the services themselves, this
106. Id. at 23-24.
107. Id. at iv.
108. This type of confusion is not confined to the "rank and file," so to speak. See Mike
Soraghan et al., AFA Official: Never Saw Case of 'True Rape', DENY. POST, Sept. 11, 2003, at
Al. Transcripts released on September 11, 2003 by the Working Group Panel showed that
in an interview with COL Sue Slavec, formerly in charge of discipline at the AFA, she stated:
I've never ... witnessed somebody who ... was taken by force, which if you look
at that end of the spectrum, a true rape or a true violent assault, I've never
seen that happen. I've seen the other parts of the spectrum ... where there is
some contributing flirtatious activity-alcohol, poor judgment involved-that
could lead to what could be, a nonconsensual activity.
Id. Alcohol, flirting, and poor judgment aside-truly "nonconsensual activity," if sexual
activity, is rape. The misconception exhibited by COL Slavec is the kind that rape victim
advocates fear most-that somehow the victims were at fault, and that somehow
nonconsensual activity can be legal.
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scandal has caused military sex crime law itself to come under
fire. 109
2. The True Significance of Power and Authority
According to the Preamble of the most recent Manual for Courts-
Martial, the purpose of military law is "to promote justice, to assist
in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to
promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment,
and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United
States.""l0 Good order and discipline mean more than troops who
do not get into trouble with the law. They comprehend the proper
functioning of leader-subordinate relationships in order to minimize
distractions from the military's foremost "responsibility ... to win
the nation's wars."111
In a unit whose leaders have abused their authority by placing
illegitimate demands on their troops, confidence in the chain of
command's legitimate direction of authority is broken. A soldier's
most sincere wish is that if she is called on to trade her life for her
country, her leader will ensure that her life is well-accounted for in
enemy dead-not wasted or thrown away due to that leader's
incompetence, fear, or selfishness. How can one trust her leader
with her life if she cannot trust him to respect her autonomy and
her sexual privacy?
The selfishness and unprofessionalism displayed by a leader who
would coerce sex from his subordinates destroys unit cohesiveness,
degrades the chain of command, and distracts troops from their
mission. The integrity of the chain of command has always been of
paramount importance, as reflected in the military's prohibitions on
intimate relationships within the command."'
Considering that the UCMJ does not significantly criminalize
many coercive sexual practices, it is very likely that their occur-
109. See supra note 104.
110. MCM, supra note 2, at Preamble, 3.
111. FM 22-100, supra note 1, at 1-2.
112. See MCM, supra note 2, pt. IV, I 83c(1) (prohibiting fraternization under UCMJ art.
134 (2000)).
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rence is seriously underreported."1 Some commentators believe
that sexual coercion occurs so frequently in the military because the
purpose of the military to fight wars can foster a culture of aggres-
sion and domination, even among members of the same team:
References are frequently made, especially in basic training, to
a man's masculinity and ability to perform. Those who do not
meet the standards, are often referred to as a "wimp, pussy, or
girl." Drill instructors have been known to call their troops
"ladies" as a form of degradation and humiliation. The male
persona is one that is strong, powerful, and in control, whereas
the female stereotype is considered weaker, powerless, and
physically unequal to their male counterparts."1
Feminist commentators often argue that coercive sexual practices
by men are a "means by which male dominance and power is
established and maintained."" 5 Other explanations for the inci-
dence of sexual coercion include socioeconomic theory, which posits
that the stratification of males and females in the workplace
reinforces female dependency and gives rise to male "oppression
and victimization."11 Yet another theory explains rape and sexual
aggression in terms of biological drives." 7
It would be too easy to blame the military culture for whatever
the sociological, psychological, economic, or biological pressures that
come to bear on the relations of men and women; in the end,
113. For a discussion of the factors contributing to underreporting and underlying survey
data supporting them, see NELSON, supra note 74, at 77-83.
114. Id. at 67; see also Dianne Herman, The Rape Culture, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVE 20,25 (Jo Freeman ed., 3ded. 1984) ("The U.S. militaryhas generally eulogized
the values of masculinity and emphasized aggressiveness: the Marines built their image on
their ability to form "men" out of adolescent youths.... Cowardice in the face of the enemy is
equated with femininity.").
115. Wendy E. Stock, Feminist Explanations: Male Power, Hostility, and Sexual Coercion,
in SEXUAL COERCION, supra note 82, at 61. The author goes on to say that sexual coercion
"occurs systematically in this culture, perpetrated by a relatively more powerful class of
males upon a relatively less powerful class, females, and how our culture supports this type
of dominance by eroticizing sexual aggression." Id.
116. Elizabeth Grauerholz & Mary A. Koralewski, What is Known and Not Known About
Sexual Coercion, in SEXUAL COERCION, supra note 82, at 187, 191-95 (discussing also other
social institutions such as the educational system, the legal institution, families, and dating).
117. See generally RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE:
BIOLOGICAL BASEs OF SEXUAL COERCION (2000).
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however, the choice to exert power over another is an individual
choice, one whose outcome lies solely within the control of that
person. Along with an indoctrination emphasizing aggression,
dominance, and decisive action, service members are also trained
to temper those qualities with values such as "loyalty, duty, respect,
selfless service, honor, integrity and personal courage.""' The
people who choose to let their aggression run rampant do so not
because the military has trained them to do so, but because they
have chosen to ignore the aspects of military culture that deny them
their "fun" and emphasize the parts of that culture that allow them
to rationalize their behavior.
It is more accurate to say that the nature of the military struc-
ture, more so than its culture, makes the exploitation of rank or
authority to gain sex more likely. The CAAF's acknowledgment of
the "unique situation of dominance and control""9 created by the
difference in military rank is a recognition of this principle. Human
nature is such that where there is opportunity to use an advantage,
such as a difference in power, 2 ' there will be some who attempt to
use it illegitimately.' 2'
It is important to recognize what significance military structure,
such as the hierarchy of rank and power, can contribute to the
118. FM 22-100, supra note 1, at 2-3 to 2-10. Although these represent the seven Army
values, each service has its own equivalent.
119. United States v. Bradley, 28 M.J. 197, 200 (C.M.A. 1989).
120. Both the Working Group and the Fowler Commission emphasized that sexual
misconduct was most frequently directed at females in younger classes at the AFA. See
PANEL REPORT, supra note 99, at 68-70; WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 94, at 74-96.
The Fowler Commission recognized that:
[A]ny system in which people are placed in a position of power over others has
the potential for abuse. Accordingly, the Panel concurs with the Working Group
Report finding that the cadet authority structure establishes a disparity of
power that may make subordinate cadets, particularly female Fourth-Class
cadets, more vulnerable to upper class male cadets who might abuse their
authority.
PANEL REPORT, supra note 99, at 68-69.
121. Tonna Pallas, a rape victim therapist, describes a likely motivation underlying rape:
Usually people who are sexually violent are feeling some kind of pain, anger or
loneliness.... They're feeling powerless, and that's hard to live with for very
long. They want to get rid of those feelings, so they rape. It's all about power
and control, and not about intimate sexual behavior.
Amy Herdy, Battling Stereotypes: Violence and Terror, Not Sex, At Root of Rapes, Expert
Says, DENV. POST, Mar. 2,2003, at A7 (quoting Tonna Pallas, a therapist with Denver's Rape
Assistance and Awareness Program).
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analysis of sexual coercion. The concept of "disparity of power"
mentioned in the Working Group Report and the Panel Report is
indeed useful, though only in a broader psychological or sociological
analysis of why rape occurs, not in a legal analysis of whether it has
occurred. The "disparity of power" between superiors and subordi-
nates may provide the superior the opportunity to control the
timing, location, and surrounding circumstances of the encounter
in which the alleged rape occurs 22-but there is nothing inherent
in the rank or authority itself that would demonstrate to a
factfinder that a rape is more or less likely to have occurred. 2 '
Of the countless lessons to be learned, one should stand to
the forefront: military law not only must comprehend nonviolent
coercive sexual imposition, but also must recognize that it is not
rape. Explicitly criminalizing the abuse of military authority, albeit
under criminal sanctions other than those reserved for rape, is itself
enough to justify a reform of Article 120. In a time of either peace
or war, troops need to focus on the mission without worrying about
being harmed by their leaders.
III. AN INCLUSIVE SCHEME
A. Continuum of Culpability
Applying an analysis of the three types of pressures that the
perpetrator can bring to bear on the victim (compulsion, coercion,
and persuasion) yields a continuum of culpability from greatest to
least in the following scenarios:
1. Actual force is applied with resulting physical harm.
2. Actual force is applied, but to a lesser degree. There is no
beating, although there is some physical manifestation of
the perpetrator's aggression, perhaps grabbing or pulling off
clothes. The victim is compelled to cooperate by the implied
threat of beating as in the previous scenario.
122. Each of these factors (timing, location, surroundings) are relevant, but are already
considered in constructive force analysis. See supra notes 41.42 and accompanying text.
123. This is not to say that rank or authority, and its attendant "disparity of power," is not
coercive; it may create a situation that is highly coercive-but in a nonviolent fashion. For
example, see the hypothetical infra note 125.
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3. No actual force is applied. There is, however, an express threat
of force sufficient to render resistance apparently and reason-
ably futile.
4. No actual force is applied, although a threat of force is suffi-
ciently and reasonably apparent to be implied in the circum-
stances.
In these four scenarios, the perpetrator should be charged with
rape. Constructive force would be necessary in each of the situa-
tions except the first. The maximum severity of the punishment
should reflect the nature of his actions or threats, descending from
death or life in prison for violent action to a significant term of
incarceration, such as forty years, for forcible coercion. Rank should
not be a factor in this analysis.
124
5. No force is involved in the encounter, although the perpetrator
expresses a threat of nonviolent harm.
Consideration of rank has its place here-if a leader has em-
ployed his rank to create the illegitimate choice in his subordinate
(to have unwanted sex or to experience some other wrong), he
should be subject to substantial criminal sanctions. The "disparity
of power" must be actively employed, however; the mere presence
of the superior's rank should not make him criminally culpable
(beyond that of fraternization). The culpable act is the misuse of
that rank to pressure sex from an otherwise unwilling subordinate.
6. No force is involved in the encounter and no express threats of
nonviolent harm are made, yet nonviolent repercussions can be
easily inferred from the totality of the circumstances.
Situations five and six should be charged as criminal sexual
conduct, with a much lower maximum punishment than rape, but
much higher than Article 93 Maltreatment-ranging perhaps
between five and twenty-five years. The coercion in these circum-
stances would have to be nontrivial 125 and the severity of the
124. See supra Part I.C.
125. The word "nontrivial" in a proposed statute or commentary may be viewed as too
ambiguous. The need for such a distinction is important, however, and may be described as
follows: For coercion to be nontrivial, it would have to overcome what society assumes is the
average person's natural reluctance to engage in unwanted sex. For example, if a drill
sergeant threatened to make the victim's platoon do extra physical training if she did not
submit to sexual contact, the coercion is arguably trivial, because the avoidance of increased
training for her comrades would not induce a reasonable person to capitulate, and thus
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punishment should reflect the nature of the ultimatum imposed
on the victim. Implied threats of nonviolent, but coercive, action
would be extremely difficult to prove. If they can be established,
then criminal sanctions should be imposed in the same fashion as
with express threats.
7. An express promise of gain is used to achieve intercourse, and
later turns out to be fraudulent.
The seventh situation is not the result of a grave public wrong,
and as such should not be subject to criminal sanction beyond what
is covered by sexual harassment, maltreatment, and solicitation
statutes. The analysis does not change if the victim actually sleeps
with the perpetrator.
8. An express promise of gain is used to achieve intercourse, and
the promisor actually performs.
This last action is also not a public wrong beyond that which is
already prohibited by laws against prostitution.
B. A New Statute and a New "Old" Statute
A new statutory scheme must accomplish two goals: (1) preserve
the distinction between forcible rape and all other forms of coercive
sex; while (2) creating separate crimes to cover wrongful, yet
nonviolent, behavior that is calculated to pressure another person
to submit to sexual contact. The best way to do this is to resist the
temptation to revise heavily or expand Article 120 itself, but to
supplement it with another punitive Article. Doing so will recognize
that rape is a distinctly different crime than sexual coercion (a
crime of violence versus a crime of extortion), and would support
the dearth of traditional judicial treatment of the subject.
The new punitive Article, temporarily numbered 120a, follows a
slightly revised version of the original Article 120:
surrender her sexual autonomy. On the other hand, threatening to revoke off-post privileges
for a substantial amount of time could reasonably be considered nontrivial, because such an
action greatly restricts the victim's freedom of physical movement.
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Article 120 - Rape and Carnal Knowledge 12 6
a. Text
(1) Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act of
sexual intercourse by force and without consent, is guilty
of rape and shall be punished:
(a) by death if the intercourse results in the death of the
victim; 127 or
(b) by imprisonment of a maximum term of life, if the
intercourse is consummated by violent action; or
(c) by imprisonment of a maximum term of forty years,
if the intercourse is consummated by threats of
violent action, implied or expressed;1" and
(d) such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.
(2) Any person subject to this chapter who, under circum-
stances not amounting to rape, commits an act of sexual
intercourse with a person -
(a) who is not his or her spouse; and
(b) who has not attained the age of sixteen years, is
guilty of carnal knowledge and shall be punished as
a court-martial may direct.
(3) Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete either
offense under this Article.
(4) In a prosecution under subsection (2) _129
(a) it is an affirmative defense that:
(A) the person with whom the accused committed
the act of sexual intercourse had at the time of
126. For the current version of the statute, see UCMJ art. 120 (2000). See also MCM,
supra note 2, pt. IV, 45. The versions of Articles 120 and 120a that are printed in this Note
do not include a description of lesser-included offenses, commentary and explanation, or
sample specifications, as they would not add to a discussion of the merits of changing the
scope of the UCMJ.
127. The addition of a(1)(a) is meant to bring the language of the UCMJ within the
Supreme Court's decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (indicating that the death penalty was unconstitutional "as long as the rapist
does not himself take the life of his victim"). There is also an indication that the death
penalty may be constitutionally permissible in cases where the victim is a child. Id. at 592
(limiting the issue considered to the rape of an adult woman). The current Rules for Courts-
Martial (RCM) provide several military-specific aggravating factors as well. See MCM, supra
note 2, R.C.M. 1004(c).
128. The addition of a(l)(c) above also reflects the fact that the most severe punishments,
death and life in prison, should be reserved for the most culpable of sexual predators--those
who will stop at nothing to overcome a victim's will.
129. Subsection a(4) was reorganized for clarity.
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the alleged offense attained the age of twelve
years; and
(B) the accused reasonably believed that the person
had at the time of the alleged offense attained
the age of sixteen years.
(b) The accused has the burden of proving a defense
under subparagraph (4)(a) by a preponderance of the
evidence.
b. Elements
(1) Rape
(a) That the accused committed an act of sexual inter-
course;
(b) by force and without consent.
(2) Carnal knowledge
(a) That the accused committed an act of sexual inter-
course with a person;
(b) That the person was not the accused's spouse; and
(c) That at the time of the sexual intercourse the person
was under sixteen years of age.
Article 120a - Criminal sexual conduct
a. Text
(1) Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act
of sexual contact 30 without voluntary consent,1 3 1 is
guilty of criminal sexual conduct and shall be punished:
(a) by imprisonment of a maximum term of twenty-five
years, if consent to the intercourse was coerced as a
result of an express threat of wrongful action;1 32 or
130. The words "sexual contact" in the statute for criminal sexual contact should be read
to include many more forms of physical acts that fall short of the "sexual intercourse"
requirement for rape under Article 120.
131. The words "without voluntary consent" are crucial to the understanding of the new
crime in Article 120a. Unlike rape, consent has been given and no force is necessary to
consummate the crime. The nature of the crime is in the coercive means employed to obtain
consent, not in the complete absence of consent.
132. "Wrongful action" is deliberately inclusive. It comprehends any detriment that will
result from withholding consent. Wrongful action does not necessarily exclude physical force,
making a(1) a possible lesser-included crime of Article 120 rape.
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(b) by imprisonment of a maximum term often years, 133
if consent to the intercourse was coerced as a result
of the victim's reasonable belief under all the circum-
stances that wrongful action would otherwise
result;13 4 and
(c) such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.
b. Elements
(1) That the accused committed an act of sexual contact
with another person; and
(2) That the act of sexual contact was done without the
voluntary consent of the other person.
CONCLUSION
The call to revise the UCMJ's treatment of criminal sexual
misconduct is not a new one, but earlier focus has frequently been
misguided, choosing to expand rape law to cover other forms of
nonviolent coercion rather than supplementing rape law with an
additional criminal sexual misconduct statute. The purpose of this
Note is not to provide a final solution in the form of the revised
Articles, but to encourage legislative examination and action. Any
revision of the UCMJ in terms of sexual predators' actions and their
effects on victim autonomy will yield several positive results. Such
an approach leaves traditional forcible rape analysis, as it devel-
oped in the military, relatively untouched. Stability in the law is not
the same as stagnation, and rape law in the military prior to
Simpson and its kin adequately served to punish the most culpable
of sexual predators-rapists. Separating rape from other forms of
133. The coercion in a(1)(b) is not susceptible of direct proof, which is reflected in the
lesser degree of punishment. The author of this Note believes that because the prosecution
is not required to show outward expression of the intent of the perpetrator, the accused
should not be at risk of as severe punishment. One can make an analogy to attempt crimes,
which typically impose punishment in rough proportion to how substantial a step the
perpetrator must have made toward the completed crime to be guilty. The less substantial
the step, the less clearly the defendant has manifested his mens rea, a necessary element of
the crime.
134. One could plausibly claim that the distinction made between a(lXa) and a(1)(b) is an
example of overlegislation, failing to account for the discretion that the judge has in
sentencing the defendant according to the circumstances of his particular case. The
legislature might reasonably make this distinction, however, on similar rationales as those
for creating sentencing guidelines.
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criminal sexual conduct will also serve to end the creeping expan-
sion of the military courts' rape analysis, because factors such as
rank and authority will have a legitimate place in proving other
coercive sex crimes. There is simply no such thing as "rape by
authority."
It is essential for judges, legislators, and legal scholars to
acknowledge the difference between the crime of rape (in which
the only choice left in the victim is whether to expose herself to
greater harm by struggling futilely) and nonviolent coercive sexual
imposition (in which the victim retains the ultimate choice to
submit in order to avoid other impositions). The recognition of a
continuum of destructive behavior that falls short of rape, yet is
destructive to personal liberty and thus to unit discipline and
morale, allows the military justice system to accomplish its goals of
rehabilitation, punishment, protection, preservation, and deter-
rence. To fail to proscribe these grave public wrongs implicitly
condones them, allowing them to go unreported, unpunished, and
unchecked in their devastating effects on personnel and mission
accomplishment.
Inquiring into the pressures exerted by the accused to achieve
sexual intercourse will also provide a sound basis for measuring
culpability. The proposed revisions to Article 120 and the proposed
Article 120a provide a more flexible punitive scheme, affording a
closer fit between the seriousness of the crime and the magnitude
of the sentence. This flexibility will remove the dilemma of the
current military panels in choosing whether improperly to convict
a person of rape who has coerced sex, rather than compelled it, or
declare them innocent while knowing his actions were culpable to
some degree.
In an environment where sexual predators and abusive leaders
have been removed, the fragile yet powerful trust so necessary to
successful military relationships can reestablish itself and eventu-
ally thrive. If we expect our servicemen and women to submit
unquestioningly to their superiors, their superiors must be above
question. Having thus removed the enemy within our troops' midst,
all eyes will turn to the enemy to the front.
Captain Alexander N. Pickands
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